← Back to Insights

Philosophy · Neuroscience · Human Behaviour · Cognitive Sovereignty

The competence of evil and the true demand of virtue

Power, restraint and the architecture of choice

Marcela Araki Yamaguti · 07 November 2026 · 10 min read

A marble lion at rest on a travertine plinth, its paws crossed, with a small gold ring beside them, in a gallery lit by natural light.

In a conversation with Mathias Döpfner on the MD Meets podcast, Peter Thiel offered a provocation that deserves more than indignation. We moralise far too much, he said. The opposite of good has two senses: the moral antonym is evil; the functional antonym is bad. Whoever is evil, he suggested, is usually at least competent, because doing evil on a large scale requires intelligence, organisation and the ability to mobilise resources.

The distinction is built into ordinary language. An evil man and a bad doctor fail in different ways: the first in his purpose, the second in his execution. That is precisely why Thiel's question is uncomfortable. In a culture that grants moral superiority to anyone who declares good intentions, it forces us to ask what goodness is worth when it is not accompanied by the capacity to act.

The provocation is a good one, and it has a long history. The most interesting answer lies beyond the point where he left it.

A distinction older than it seems

Thiel repeats, almost word for word, an idea of Nietzsche's. In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche shows that we judge people by two different measures. In the first, the opposition is between good and bad: good is the strong, the capable; bad is the weak, the one who cannot. In the second, the opposition is between good and evil, and those who feel powerless begin to call the strong evil and their own weakness virtue. That is why, when we call someone evil, we often recognise, without noticing, the strength they have.

Hence our enduring fascination with the great villain of literature, history and politics. He gathers qualities that, taken one by one, we would admire in any leader: strategic intelligence, discipline, patience, foresight and a fine reading of human motives. What makes him devastating is the combination of these competences with ends we condemn.

Two measures, four combinations

The provocation should be read with care. Thiel's target is a society that has developed a moral vocabulary more sophisticated than its capacity to produce results.

Once the two measures are separated, four combinations appear: the good and capable, the good and incapable, the evil and capable, the evil and incapable. Imagine two leaders. The first is respectful, principled in what he says and concerned with justice, yet cannot organise a team, make difficult decisions, protect those who work with him or bring projects to completion. The second has excellent strategic ability, understands incentives, anticipates conflict and mobilises resources, yet uses all of it for his own benefit, even when it harms others. Neither is the leader a team needs.

Efficiency is a property of action; virtue also requires us to examine purpose, means and consequences. A person can carry out perfectly what should never have been done. Nor does evil require greatness: great harm also comes from ordinary people, inside systems that dilute responsibility, where each person performs their part and no one feels like the author of the result.

Competence and evil, then, travel separately, and neither presupposes the other. Thiel's insight lies in the reverse diagnosis: goodness without the capacity to act also does harm, and that is the question worth dwelling on.

Two people facing an injustice

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in the chapter “On Those Who Are Sublime”, Nietzsche mocks the weaklings “who thought themselves good because they had lame paws”. The irony touches a real difficulty: telling apart the virtue built through self-mastery from the conduct imposed by incapacity.

Imagine two people facing an injustice. The first does not react because she fears conflict, cannot set limits and dreads the consequences of any confrontation. The second recognises the seriousness of the situation, has the resources to defend herself, knows the possible responses and chooses to act with moderation. From the outside, both display the same peaceful behaviour. On the inside, they have made decisions of a different nature.

Neuroscience helps us see the difference. In the first person, the decision belongs to the defence system: faced with a threat, the brain triggers ancient survival responses, such as fleeing, freezing or yielding, without passing through deliberation (LeDoux, 2012). In the second, the decision belongs to regulation: the prefrontal cortex, the region that weighs context, reinterprets the situation, tempers emotion and keeps options open while the choice is being made (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). The two behaviours look alike, yet they were born of opposite paths.

This difference does not make the person who is afraid inferior; fear has a history, and it is often right. It reveals that similar behaviours can arise from very different mechanisms and express different degrees of freedom. Restraint exists only where there is an alternative: whoever could never have acted otherwise was led to peace without ever choosing it.

Learning to be able not to be good

Machiavelli framed the question with a precision that still unsettles. In chapter XV of The Prince, after separating how we live from how we ought to live, he writes that a prince who wishes to maintain himself must “learn to be able not to be good, and to use this or not use it according to necessity”. The weight of the sentence lies in the word able.

A ruler may have honest intentions, defend admirable values and sincerely wish his people well. If he cannot recognise threats, anticipate conflict, understand interests and make difficult decisions, his integrity will not be enough: the inability to protect what lies under his responsibility can produce consequences as serious as deliberate harm.

The Machiavellian notion of virtù gives a name to this capacity for action. It combines courage, discernment, initiative and the ability to respond to circumstances, above all when reality proves unpredictable, what Machiavelli calls fortune (chapter XXV). Its relevance remains evident across very different structures of leadership, from political institutions to organisations and personal relationships. Values also need resources to be defended: a moral conscience paired with strategic naivety is vulnerable precisely to those who know the mechanisms of power well.

In the same chapter of Zarathustra, Nietzsche reaches Machiavelli's point from the other side. Addressing the powerful, he writes: “I believe you capable of every evil; that is why I want the good from you.” And he asks that the goodness of the powerful be their final victory over themselves. In this reading, goodness is the highest way of governing one's own strength.

What power does to those who hold it

If virtue presupposes capability, capability carries its own risk. Research on power describes three effects. The first is disinhibition: according to Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003), people who feel powerful pursue what they want more quickly and feel less of the brakes that normally hold behaviour back. The second is a loss of attunement to others: in experiments, simply asking people to recall a situation in which they had power was enough to make them consider other people's point of view less (Galinsky and colleagues, 2006) and mirror less, in their own brains, the movements of those they were watching (Hogeveen, Inzlicht and Obhi, 2014). The third appears with time.

Studying American presidents and British prime ministers over the last hundred years, the physician and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen and the psychiatrist Jonathan Davidson gave this third effect a name: hubris syndrome (2009). The word comes from the Greek hybris, the excess that, in tragedy, comes before the fall. It is a clinical proposal, still outside the diagnostic manuals: a set of changes that emerge after years of concentrated power and tend to recede when power ends. Among the signs described are excessive confidence in one's own judgement, contempt for the advice of others, a confusion between oneself and the institution one leads, a growing detachment from reality and an impulsiveness that disregards the details of execution.

Power, then, reveals who someone is and, over time, reorganises what that person is able to perceive.

Moral psychology explains the other half of the process. Albert Bandura called moral disengagement the mechanisms that allow a person to cause harm without condemning themselves. They appear in everyday language:

  • Moral justification: “it was for the good of the company”.
  • Euphemistic labelling: calling mass lay-offs an “efficiency adjustment”.
  • Advantageous comparison: “our competitors do far worse”.
  • Displacement and diffusion of responsibility: “I was only carrying out the board's decision”, “everyone signed it off”.
  • Distortion of consequences: “no one will remember this tomorrow”.
  • Dehumanisation and blaming the victim: “he isn't one of us”, “he provoked it”.

Consider someone deeply committed to a personal, political or professional achievement. As ambition grows, obstacles come to be read as threats to a higher purpose, and behaviour once unacceptable acquires seemingly reasonable justifications. The suffering caused becomes a necessary cost, manipulation comes to be understood as strategy, and transgression is absorbed into the language of effectiveness.

This process can unfold without the person ever abandoning their identity as someone morally upright. Their intelligence takes part in building ever more sophisticated justifications that preserve a positive image of themselves. Here one of the great paradoxes of human competence emerges: the same capacity that makes it possible to understand complex situations, anticipate consequences and develop solutions also serves to rationalise harmful decisions. Knowledge alone does not ensure wisdom, just as strategic intelligence does not guarantee moral maturity.

Naming before acting

The first step is to acknowledge the impulses that come with power. The desire for recognition, the need for control, aggression and ambition belong to the human repertoire. When left unexamined, they take part in decisions silently, including those that present themselves as purely rational.

There is simple evidence on this point. Naming precisely what one feels reduces activity in the amygdala, the region that sounds the emotional alarm, and increases activity in a prefrontal area that regulates it (Lieberman and colleagues, 2007). Think of the reply written in the heat of a difficult meeting: whoever can say to themselves “I am angry and I want to win this argument” is no longer entirely under that anger's command. Recognising an impulse takes away part of its automatic control. That is what makes it possible to turn aggression into assertiveness, ambition into achievement, the desire for influence into leadership and the need for control into responsibility for what is truly ours to answer for.

This transformation requires a work of self-regulation that goes beyond mere repression: understanding the function of each impulse, recognising the circumstances that set it off and building responses consistent with chosen values. It also requires tolerating the discomfort of difficult decisions: a necessary confrontation stirs fear, a limit stirs guilt, and fidelity to a principle may cost a concrete advantage. The quality of a decision depends, in part, on the ability to remain aware of these tensions without letting them automatically determine one's conduct.

Three levels of a single choice

Thiel's provocation therefore calls for an answer on three levels. At the neural level, virtue depends on the ability to regulate one's own reactivity, so that the response is born of choice, even in the presence of fear and impulse. At the narrative level, it depends on the honesty of the stories we tell ourselves, because that is where moral disengagement takes hold. At the strategic level, it depends on competence: without virtù, the best of intentions protects no one.

A society that values only intentions neglects results. A society fascinated by efficiency stops asking about ends and means. Maturity lies in integrating the three layers, and this is what we call cognitive sovereignty: the capacity to govern one's own strength.

A person able to exercise power without depending on it to confirm their own worth finds a rare form of autonomy. Their security does not require the submission of others, and their strength coexists with the deliberate possibility of restraint. Character is revealed in the choices we make; competence determines how far those choices reach.

Plato left this question in the form of a myth. In the second book of the Republic, Glaucon tells the story of Gyges, the shepherd who finds a ring that makes him invisible and, freed from consequences, uses it to seize the kingdom. The question remains the same, and it deserves to accompany anyone who seeks power, influence or leadership. If a person has never had a real chance to act cruelly, how far can we assess the depth of their virtue? And what would their choices reveal if one day they had enough power to act without immediate fear of the consequences?

References

  • Bandura (1999): Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193–209.
  • Galinsky, Magee, Inesi and Gruenfeld (2006): Power and perspectives not taken. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1068–1074.
  • Hogeveen, Inzlicht and Obhi (2014): Power changes how the brain responds to others. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(2), 755–762.
  • Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003): Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychological Review, 110(2), 265–284.
  • LeDoux (2012): Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron, 73(4), 653–676.
  • Lieberman and colleagues (2007): Putting feelings into words: affect labeling disrupts amygdala activity in response to affective stimuli. Psychological Science, 18(5), 421–428.
  • Machiavelli (1532): The Prince, chapters XV and XXV.
  • Nietzsche (1883): Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part two, “On Those Who Are Sublime”.
  • Nietzsche (1887): On the Genealogy of Morality, first essay.
  • Ochsner and Gross (2005): The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(5), 242–249.
  • Owen and Davidson (2009): Hubris syndrome: an acquired personality disorder? A study of US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers over the last 100 years. Brain, 132(5), 1396–1406.
  • Plato: The Republic, book II.
  • Thiel: interview with Mathias Döpfner on the MD Meets podcast.

Readings and comments

A space for resonance. Leave your reading, your disagreement, or what this text opened in you.

Your email is never published.

Be the first to comment on this essay.